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THEGOODNEWSABOUTAITERIT~ 
DERRIDA AND THEOLOGY 
John D. Caputo 
Derrida's work is often mistakenly criticized as a kind of linguistic sUbjective 
idealism which traps us inside a chain of linguistic signifiers, unable to do 
anything but play vainly with linguistic strings. In fact, Derrida's thought is 
through and through a philosophy of "alterity," of openness to the other, 
which provides a rich and vigorous catalyst for religious thought. After dem-
onstrating the wrongheadedness of the subjectivist reading of Derrida, I go 
on to show the richness of this philosophy of alterity for theology: first, in 
terms of the negative theology, where alterity refers to God as the absolutely 
Other; and then in terms of ethics of alterity, in which it is shown that, like 
Levinasian ethics, deconstruction is a philosophy of responsibility for the 
singularity of the other. I conclude with a note on Jesus as a master of alterity. 
Misunderstanding Derrida 
"Postmodern" thinking, if it means anything at all, means a philosophy of 
"alterity," a relentless attentiveness and sensitivity to the "other."1 Postmod-
ernism stands for a kind of hyper-sensitivity to many "others": the other 
person, other species, "man's" other, the other of the West, of Europe, of 
Being, of the "classic," of philosophy, of reason, etc. (The list goes on.) This 
approach has produced numerous, sometimes brilliant and sometimes merely 
eccentric results, a vast body of unorthodox and provocative approaches to 
madness, illness, criminality psychoanalysis, architecture, the university, lit-
erary, historical and legal interpretation, the history of philosophy, and phi-
losophy itself. 
But the philosophy of alterity provides an equally fertile and suggestive 
opening for religious reflection, which is something that I hope to show here 
is especially true of the work of Jacques Derrida. Unfortunately, the signifi-
cance of Derrida's work has been obscured by a particularly perverse misun-
derstanding of deconstruction, one which, to anyone who has taken the 
considerable trouble required to gain familiarity with his texts, seems quite 
ironic (if not amusing). For the notion has gained currency that deconstruction 
traps us inside the "chain of signifiers," in a kind of linguistic-subjective 
idealism, unable to do anything but play vainly with linguistic strings. That, 
were it true, would be an odd result for a philosophy of alterity, a very unkind 
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fate to visit upon a philosophy whose every effort is bent upon turning toward 
the other. Were that true, Derrida's work would surely be of no use for 
understanding Christian faith and tradition, since it would make nonsense out 
of the interpretation of classical texts and the articulation of shared beliefs. 
I hope to show that the unique strength of deconstruction lies in exactly the 
opposite tendency of this misunderstanding, in the special skills it has culti-
vated in awakening us to the demands made by the other, and that this has 
interesting and provocative implications for theological reflection. Decon-
struction is a rich and vigorous catalyst for religious thought, but that point 
is largely lost in the midst of the ill-conceived and panicky reactions it 
provokes. 
This misunderstanding of deconstruction, which even supposes that the 
very idea of "misunderstanding deconstruction" is undermined by decon-
struction, is often the result of too hastily construing the texts of a difficult, 
elusive and playful author whose project is far more affirmative-deconstruc-
tion is affirmation2-than it sometimes sounds to more traditional ears. But 
this distortion of Derrida is not without political significance, for it is fre-
quently attached to a reactionary political agenda which vigorously opposes 
the efforts of women, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities to have their voices 
heard. 3 Yet these are the very voices of alterity-the "call of the other"-in 
which deconstructive analyses take an interest. 
After briefly indicating how this misunderstanding is to be set aside, I turn 
to the profit that deconstruction holds for theological reflection, which is, I 
hope to show, to lend a hand in announcing the good news of alterity. While 
there are numerous issues in terms of which this point could be developed I 
have chosen to address but two here: the questions of God and of religious 
ethics. 
The Other of Language 
Derrida's justly famous, but unjustly notorious, declaration, "There is nothing 
outside the text" (it n 'y a pas de hors-texte),4 has been widely interpreted as 
a denial of reference, as if Derrida thinks there is nothing other than words 
and texts. That, were it construed as a metaphysical claim, would constitute 
a sort of linguistic Berkeleyianism, incoherent on its face (texts are after all 
material objects), with which Derrida has nothing in common. Alternatively, 
and somewhat less madly, Derrida is taken to advocate a vague subjectivistic 
scepticism, according to which signifiers are seen as leading only to other 
signifiers, leaving in doubt the character of anything outside of signifiers, 
anything real or really other, and leaving us in a cloud of confusion, unde-
cidability, and inaction. One way to see the error here-and I apologize for 
the dogmatic tone-is to see that it conflates the "hors" of "hors-texte" with 
the "other of language," the referent (ens significatum). For while there is 
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nothing for Derrida which escapes the constraints of textuality. it is no less 
true that everything that Derrida has written has had in mind the other of 
language. the alterity by which language is claimed:5 
There have been several misinterpretations of what I and other deconstruc-
tionists are trying to do. It is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a 
suspension of reference. Deconstruction is always deeply concerned with the 
'other' of language. I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work 
as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language, that we are imprisoned 
in language; it is, in fact, saying the exact opposite. The critique of logocen-
trism is above all else the search for the 'other' and the 'other of language'. 
Every week I receive critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction 
which operate on the assumption that what they call 'post-structuralism' 
amounts to saying that there is nothing beyond language, that we are sub-
merged in words-and other stupidities [my emphasis] of that sort. Certainly, 
deconstruction tries to show that the question of reference is much more 
complex and problematic than traditional theories supposed. It even asks 
whether our term 'reference' is entirely adequate for designating the 'other'. 
The other, which is beyond language and which summons language, is per-
haps not a 'referent' in the normal sense which linguists have attached to this 
term. But to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure. to challenge 
or complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying 
that there is nothing beyond language. 
And again:6 
This misinterpretation is not just a simplification; it is symptomatic of certain 
political and institutional interests-interests which must also be decon-
structed in their turn. I totally refuse the label of nihilism which has been 
ascribed to me and my American colleagues. Deconstruction is not an enclo-
sure in nothingness, but an openness towards the other. 
Deconstruction means to complicate reference, not to deny it; it insists that 
there is no reference without difference, no reference (i/ n 'y a pas) outside 
of a textual chain (hors-texte). It argues that the range of reference of a term 
is set by its place within a systemic code, that its reference is both made 
possible and limited by the space that it occupies within a linguistic system 
(difference). Deconstruction wants to trouble the expression "reference" as 
an excessively subjectivistic term which overestimates the ego cogito of the 
speaking subject while underestimating the power of the linguistic system 
within which the speaker operates.7 This delimitation of reference is moti-
vated not by subjectivism or scepticism but by a kind of hypersensitivity to 
otherness, by a profound vigilance about the other of language. Derrida is 
constantly alerting us to the constructedness of what we call the "reality" of 
the "extra-linguistic," and he is relentlessly, systematically, let us say, Socrati-
cally suspicious of the prestige of the ruling discourse, of the system of 
exclusions that is put in place when a language claims to be the language of 
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reality itself, when a language is taken to be what being itself would say were 
it given a tongue. 
This can be seen from the special attention Derrida has paid to the problem 
of the proper name.8 For the reference of a proper name is the singularity of 
an unrepeatable individual, that being whose being is incommunicable, and 
this by means of the coded, repeatable, commonly shared signifiers of a 
spoken or written discourse. A truly or absolutely proper name would be a 
unique, unrepeatable, idiosyncratic mark or sound that would be unrecogniz-
able by the members of any linguistic community. If a name were truly proper, 
it would not be a true name; if it were a recognizable name, it would not be 
truly proper. Derrida's work here, as elsewhere, is to explore the limits of our 
most common notions and to keep a Socratic watch over the elusiveness both 
of the singularity which slips through the grids of discourse and of discourse 
itself. He puts us on warning about the claims of language to lay hold to the 
things themselves. Every claim to the "things themselves" is a claim made 
within and by means of the resources of a certain language which has its own 
limits and within the framework of a complex set of contextual presupposi-
tions which can never be saturated. There are no things themselves outside 
these textual and contextual limits, no naked contact with being which some-
how shakes loose of the coded system which makes notions like the "things 
themselves" possible to begin with and which enables speakers to refer to 
them. But all this is said not in order to throw the speaker into confusion or 
to lock the speaker up in a linguistic prison, but out of a hypersensitivity to 
the other of language. This "other" is neither reducible to language and strings 
of linguistic signifiers nor is it something which can shake loose from lan-
guage as if it fell full blown and wholly constituted from the sky. 
Deconstruction is a work of delimitation, of understanding the limits under 
which we labor, a "new Enlightenment"9 which raises our level of vigilance 
about what calls itself reference or subjectivity or objectivity. Similar analy-
ses could be undertaken about the deconstruction of "truth," "tradition," 
"ethics," etc. The impetus and the point of all such work is never destructive, 
never aimed at simply levelling or razing these structures. The point of de-
construction is to loosen and unlock structures, to let the shock of alterity set 
them in motion, to allow them to function more freely and inventively, to 
produce new forms. Deconstruction gives old texts new readings, old tradi-
tions new twists; it urges that regularizing structures and normalizing insti-
tutions-everything from literature to democracy-function more freely, 
more open-endedly, by exposing them to the trauma of something unexpected, 
something to come, to the alter which remains ever on the margins of texts 
and traditions, which eludes and elicits our discourse, which shakes and 
solicits our institutions. Deconstruction warns against letting a discourse or 
a discursive tradition close over or shut down, for that can only have the 
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effect of silencing and excluding. I do not mean to suggest that deconstruction 
is the doing of a cunning and powerful subjective deconstructive agent. 
Rather, in a deconstructive analysis, one lets it be seen that the system in 
question lacks the cohesiveness and closure to which it lays claim, that it is 
not what it says it is. But by letting this out, one points to something there, 
in these systems, which struggles to twist free of the system. The watchword 
of deconstruction, one of them at least, is the open-ended call viens!, come, 
let something new come. 10 
Seen thus, deconstruction is not the sworn enemy of faith or religious 
institutions, although it can cause a lot of well deserved trouble to a faith or 
an institution that has frozen over into immobility. Deconstruction is, as I 
hope to show, a way to approach faith, one which lets faith say viens!, lets it 
function more ad-ventfully, with an enhanced sense of advent and event, 
gladdened by the good news of alterity by which we are always and already 
summoned. 
The Otherness of God 
The other is never simply inside or outside language. The other is never 
conceivable or referable except by means of the resources of linguistic dif-
ference, yet it is never reducible to a string of signifiers. The other is a being 
of marginality, on the margins of language, occupying the point of contact 
where language opens up to things and where things break in upon and break 
open language. Derrida has put this argument about "marginality" to work 
on many levels: on that of the "things themselves" of Husserl's and Heideg-
ger's phenomenologies, and also on that of the "absolutely other" (autrui) of 
Emmanuel Levinas which is or wants to be beyond being and phenomenality, 
to be more radically transcendent than the Being or the phenomena of phe-
nomenology. Derrida has also made the argument from marginality, the argu-
ment of the inside/outside, in his recurrent discussions of negative theology. 
He shows a persistent interest in "apophatic discourse," a discourse which 
by denying and negating affirms the God beyond being and language. The 
God of negative theology who inhabits the desert of silence beyond thought 
and word is an unavoidable matter of concern for Derrida. 
Derrida was first drawn into a discussion of negative theology because 
deconstruction has been at times "accused of-rather than being congratu-
lated for"ll-being itself a negative theology. According to Derrida, dif-
jerance, which is the organizing motif of his work, is neither a word (it is at 
best a word mutilated by a misspelling) nor a concept (the content signified 
by a word), nor an entity, nor any kind of a phenomenon which makes an 
appearance. That makes difjerance sound and look a little like YHWH or the 
deus absconditus, like an occulted and hidden deep ground of being and 
knowing and appearance. Now while it is true that dijjerance tends to provoke 
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a certain apophatic discourse, and true too that it tends to borrow certain 
rhetorical devices from negative theology, such an objection (or confusion) 
can be more or less directly dispatched. 
However negative negative theology is or intends to be, however much it 
wants to negate and say that God is not this and not that, even to the point 
of saying that God is not Being, however much it prays God to rid us of God, 
negative theology is still making a positive point. The negation, says Derrida, 
is a denegalion, a denial which de-negates or un-negates itself, a denial which 
by denying names of God affirms the unnameable God; a denial which by 
denial effects the return of the denied. 12 This is illustrated in a classic way 
by Meister Eckhart, the great Dominican preacher and Rhineland mystic who 
inherited the tradition of neoplatonic negative theology: 
When I said that God was not being and was above being, I did not thereby 
contest his being, but on the contrary attributed to him a more elevated 
being. \3 
Thus, to deny that God is Being is by denying to affirm that God is a super-
essential being, a hyperousios,14 a hyperbeing beyond being, being-otherwise 
because otherwise-than-being. The negation of God's being is at the same 
time a denegation. Moreover this radically negative discourse is a promise 
of deferred presence and intuition, for by suspending words and concepts, by 
purifying itself of creatures, the soul clears away the obstacles that impede 
the unity of soul with God. 
But differance is something different. For if differance is not a word or a 
concept, if differance is something quite unnameable, that is because it is the 
grammatical, semantic, and grammatological space in which names and con-
cepts are generated, a generative matrix whose effects are words or concepts. 
Neither active nor passive, difjerance is not itself some sort of superessential 
being, but the space between or the discernible difference that separates "run" 
and "gun," or "Laufen" and "kaufen," as opposed to their positive content. 
Difjerance thus enables these signifiers to function significantly; it consti-
tutes their signifying operation. Differance is not (only) one of its own effects, 
rather "[t]his unnameable is the play which makes possible nominal effects, 
the relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names ... ,"15 in-
cluding even the textual practice which constitutes negative theology. Dif-
jerance is not a name but the condition of possibility of names, the generating 
matrix of names. Of course, that is only true the first few times Derrida used 
it; after that, differance settles into Derrida's vocabulary and becomes (by 
use) one of his most famous names, which is why it was necessary for Derrida 
to move on. Neither name nor concept, neither entity nor super-entity, dif-
jerance is rather a certain transcendental or quasi-transcendental condition 
of possibility (and impossibility) of speaking of entities. 
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But over and above this purely negative difference between deconstruction 
and negative theology, that one is not to be confused with the other, Derrida 
has taken a positive interest in negative theology as a "textual practice,"16 in 
the protocol of apophatic discourse, which has its own rules and rhetoric. 
Derrida comes back again and again to negative theology; he does not know 
how to avoid speaking of it. That is because, in my view, the discourse of 
negative theology is paradigmatic of discourse itself as it is conceived in 
deconstruction. Language for Derrida is always promising but never quite 
making good on its promises. It is not that die Sprache spricht, language 
speaks, but rather die Sprache verspricht, language promises, to follow de 
Man's paraphrase of Heidegger. Language promises to deliver the things 
themselves, being in itself, undistorted Ansichsein, pure reference without 
difference, perfect and unimpeded intentionality. But that is a promise it 
cannot keep. The thing itself, die Sache sefbst, fa meme chose, always slips 
away, is always already deferred as well as referred, dif-ferred as well as 
referred, always delivered under the constraints of a system of differences by 
which it is framed and figured. Whatever we say of God is not true, the 
apophatic theologian teaches us, and something like that is true of everything 
for Derrida: whatever we say is not true, i.e., not true in some encompassing 
way that escapes the constraints of differance. That is the situation of lan-
guage itself for Derrida, whether the referent is God or a perceptible object. 
Or else, language promises not to say a thing, to keep quiet about the thing 
itself, not to say a thing, to observe perfect silence about what is absolutely 
unnameable-God, e.g. But it is too late; negative theology has already been 
speaking and making promises. It has in fact cultivated an abundant, rich and 
complex discourse, among the most memorable and beautiful discourses the 
West has known. The notion of the naked Godhead, and of the desert union 
of the naked soul with the naked Godhead, is caught up in the chain of 
memorable metaphors and soaring images which flow from the pens of the 
great mystical poets and mystic-preachers. Such notions as these, of the silent 
union of the soul with God, of the wordless desert, of living "without why," 
of the still point of Seefengrund and Gottesgrund, of abyss united with abyss 
in a timeless, spaceless, motionless now: those beautiful images belong to 
the most soaring discourses the West has known, to the great classics of 
Western spiritual literature. Quite literally. These great spiritual masters, 
these masters of desert silence and wordlessness, do not know how to keep 
quiet. They do not know how to avoid speaking of the great secret about 
which they say-again and again-that we must all keep quiet. 
That is because, for Derrida, over and above any promise that I make or 
even that language makes, there is the promise by which the I is promised 
over to language, the promise that is "older than I am," the promise that "has 
seized the I," which delivers me over to language, a zoon promised to logosY 
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That promise, that archi-promise, puts Derrida at odds with those who think 
that ontology, the logos about being, is an "idolatry," a kind of paganism 
which turns the absolute transcendence of God, God's absolute alterity, into 
a graven image. That is the view of Levinas. Such a view is also shared by 
the great negative theologians who, like Levinas, seek a "God without Be-
ing," to use the wonderful expression of Jean-Luc Marion, a God beyond and 
above Being. ls Levinas demands an absolutely altruistic approach to the 
absolutely other. He thinks that the Heideggerian concept of Being or of the 
preunderstanding of Being blocks the otherness of the other, anticipatorily 
diminishing the absolute alterity with which the other shocks us. Taken in its 
radical alterity, the other is not being or a mode of being, something immanent 
in the world of understanding, but an excess beyond being, a radical tran-
scendence, a movement beyond (au dela), something coming from on high, 
over and beyond (meta) being (physis). What Levinas says of the other person 
(l'autrui), and by extension of God, Marion holds quite explicitly of God. 
God is without Being (Dieu sans l'etre) because God is beyond Being, be-
cause God is love, not Being. If God is without being, and if being belongs 
together with thought and language, then God inhabits the desert place staked 
out by negative theology, the place of the alogos, untainted and uncom-
promised by word or thought. The "ontological difference" of Heidegger and 
the difjerance of Derrida are antecedent horizons that compromise the abso-
lute transcendence of God and constitute for Marion a higher or "second" 
idolatry, higher than worshiping graven images, to be sure, or the constructs 
of metaphysical theology, but no less able to insinuate the idolatrous presence 
of traces and images into the absolute emptiness of the Godhead beyond God. 
Given what he has to say about marginality, Derrida does not think that it 
is possible to inhabit an absolutely desert place in which neither words nor 
concepts grow. The argument that Derrida mounted against Levinas in "Vio-
lence and Metaphysics,"19 that the archi-violence of language, the incisions 
of discourse, are unavoidable, that an absolutely inviolate alterity is a dream, 
applies a fortiori to Marion and negative theology. By taking a stand with 
"being," with the unavoidability of the discourse of being, Derrida lines 
himself up not only with Heidegger but also with Thomas Aquinas,20 who is 
sharply criticized by Marion for his interpretation of the Pseudo-Dionysius.21 
For Derrida does not think we can elude the horizon of Being and language. 
Like Aquinas, Derrida takes the God beyond being of the Christian mystical 
tradition as the superessential being of the via eminentioriae. Commenting 
on the Book of Causes, Thomas says "the first cause is beyond being (supra 
ens) inasmuch as he is infinite esse itself."22 The first cause is not a finite ens 
but the plenitude and perfection of esse subsistens, which is what Eckhart 
called the puritas essendi. The horizonality of being is inescapable for 
Heidegger, Aquinas-and Derrida. 
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Derrida thinks that the secret that negative theology wants to keep, the 
absolutely secret namelessness of God, is de-negated, i.e., unnegated and 
divulged, as a secret by negative theology, as the secret that negative theology 
harbors, indeed as the secret that defines and constitutes negative theology. 
Keeping a secret is an operation of difjerance. The deus absconditus is the 
secret that negative theology promises to keep, and the promise of negative 
theology to avoid saying a thing is what constitutes negative theology; it is 
what makes negative theology to be what it is, allowing its distinctive dis-
course, its protocols and tropes, to take shape. Of God, negative theology 
promises not to say a thing. That is what negative theology is. But by then it 
is already too late. It has already taken place23 because promising is a mode 
of differance, a discursive function, a performative speech act. For negative 
theology is a discourse whose object is the secret, a discourse that constitutes 
its object as the secret, as the nameless, dark, unutterable, unthinkable desert 
of the Godhead beyond God. Were negative theology to grow silent, were it 
to be struck dumb, were it to be silenced by the Vatican (as it sometimes is), 
then the secret would be lost; the secret that there is a secret, would go 
unnoticed. It is necessary to say again and again that there is a secret. It is 
necessary to spread the word, to let the word go forth, that of God we cannot 
say a thing. This was the mission of Meister Eckhart, e.g., who preached this 
word widely. Meister Eckhart, O.P.: Order of Preachers and of praisers and 
predicators, the author of the boldest and most beautiful sermons Christianity 
has known, and a veritable founder of the German vernacular. Do not say a 
thing, for whatever you say about God is not true: That is what Meister 
Eckhart says. But it is always too late. "Language has started without us, in 
us and and before us .... Indeed it must have been possible to speak in order 
to aIlow the question 'how to avoid speaking?' to arise."24 
As the space in which things get said, differance is the space of negative 
theology, the space in which the fine things that Meister Eckhart says take 
shape. Differance is indeed beyond being, not because it is like the Platonic 
and neoplatonic agathon but rather because it is like Plato's chora, like a 
kind of archi-matrix or primal place in which words and things are figured 
and reconfigured, in which speaking and writing take place. 25 
But if Derrida emphasizes that negative theology is further testimony to 
the unavoidability of language, to the encompassing character of differance, 
he also emphasizes the responsiveness of this discourse to alterity, for this 
discourse is always traced by the other by which it is summoned and to whom 
it directs itself in a prayer. The Confessions of St. Augustine, the Divine 
Names of Dionysius, the sermons of Meister Eckhart, all are begun, ended, 
and punctuated with prayers to God who is the beginning and the end of these 
discourses, their cause and their content. Even though it tries to "deprive 
itself of meaning or of an object," apophatic discourse "takes place," and in 
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just such a way that this very lack of an object, this very being-be yond-being 
is exactly what beckons it. This beckoning call is the "call of the other" which 
always precedes, elicits and solicits speech. Even the most utterly negative 
discourse "preserves a trace of the other. A trace of an event older than it. ... "26 
When Meister Eckhart says that God is neither this nor that, when he tries to 
eradicate God from speech, that eradicating, apophatic speech is a trace of 
what it is trying to deny. For Meister Eckhart or Dionysius, the power to 
speak well of God, "even if, in order to speak rightly or truly, it is necessary 
to avoid speaking entirely," is "a gift and an effect of God." God is both the 
origin and the reference of apophatic discourse, which is the trace of its absent 
origin:27 
This is what God's name always names. before or beyond other names: the 
trace of the singular event that will have rendered speech possible even before 
it turns itself back toward-in order to respond to-this first or last reference. 
That is why apophatic discourse must also open with a prayer that recognizes, 
assigns or assures its destination: the Other as Referent of a /egein which is 
none other than its cause. 
This "singular event" is always presupposed and has always already taken 
place. This event is "at least, the 'already there' of a phrase, the trace of a 
phrase,"28 a trace that wants to be absolutely singular, which is impossible, 
for its singularity is effaced just in virtue of its being repeatable, coded 
speech. So it is a trace that effaces itself, that reduces itself to ashes, to the 
ashes of negative theology. 
We stand always already under the call of the other, always already in the 
trace of the other, which in the case of negative theology is the God of whom 
we cannot speak. So it is only because language is always already going on 
in us that we are led to ask how not to speak. It is necessary for us to speak, 
we who stand under a "language before language," for we are always already 
addressed by the other, always already provoked and solicited (which means 
both asked and shaken), always already asked to be responsive, responding, 
responsible before this address. We are the beings promised and delivered 
over to legein, the ones who ask, too late, how not to speak, for whom, 
sometimes, not speaking is the best way, the only way, to speak well. 
Negative theology de-negates: in being as utterly negative as possible it 
bears constant witness (martyr), like a good martyr, to what it negates; nega-
tive theology is an unmistakable trace of what it negates. It keeps divulging 
(denegating) the secret of the secret, the secret that it has a secret of which 
it cannot speak, a secret situated on the very margins of language and silence. 
But that secret marks apophatic discourse, leaving its trace, and is traced out 
in its discourse. Were it not for negative theology, the secret would be lost; 
it would disappear without a trace; there would be no witness or martyrs. 
Differallce is a certain archi-trace, a trace neither in the sense of a secon-
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dary effect of a transcendent cause, like tracks left in the snow, nor in the 
sense of the active cause of its object, like the tracings of the brush which 
produce the portrait. Neither active nor passive, between active and passive, 
in the middle voice, on the margins or threshold, differance is the condition 
in which and under which the call of the other is inscribed and encoded, 
recalled and recorded, formed and figured, thought and articulated, written 
and spoken. In virtue of differance language is always going on, before us 
and without us, enabling us both to hear and to respond, to be addressed and 
to address, to call and recall and be recalled. Apophatic discourse is one of 
the things going on in differance, in the de-negating mode, in the mode of 
bearing witness to what it denies, for it cannot say a thing. Apophatic dis-
course is the most important way we have found not to speak of God. 
When Derrida says that this is what theology calls God, that in negative 
theology alterity goes under the name of God, he is saying that there is of 
course nothing about deconstruction that allows us to determine, affirm-
atively or negatively, just what it is that solicits the response of the apophatic 
discourse, whether it is something infinite or finite, divine or mundane. It 
makes no difference whether the trace is the trace of something infinite or 
finite, whether the other is God, as in theology, or something in the world. 
For what is said here applies to the trace "in general," the distinction between 
the finite and the infinite, the "space" or the difference between them, being 
itself a matter of diffCrance. It is the role of deconstruction to insist that 
discourse is always already the discourse of the other, solicited, awakened, 
drawn out of itself, by the other of language; that language is the mark or the 
trace of the other, in the double sense, the active/passive sense, of both 
marking off and being marked, of tracing and being traced, by the other of 
language. Without the trace of the other the other disappears without a trace; 
without the trace of the other, alterity itself would slip out of view. But there 
is nothing about deconstruction that settles the debate about the referent of 
apophatic discourse, nothing that affirms or falsifies the claims of faith; 
nothing that confirms or denies the claims of physiological reductionists who 
see there only the marvelous promptings not of the Spirit but of certain 
neurotransmitters. That is the age old dispute between belief and unbelief. 
Deconstruction comes equipped with a kind of armed neutrality:29 as a 
certain quasi-transcendental condition of possibility and impossibility, dif-
ferance neither includes nor excludes the positive existence of any particular 
entity. It simply sets forth the conditions-the archi-condition-under which 
existential claims are made, while raising our level of vigilance about these 
claims, arming us with a heightened sense of suspicion about the construct-
edness of our discourse, including the constructedness of the discourse which 
claims to transcend discourse. The result is to leave faith in fear and trem-
bling; but then that is a very religious result, and one of the oldest conditions 
of faith. 
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The Ethics of the Other 
Fear and trembling not only beset the faith of postmodernism but also its 
ethics, where the philosophy of alterity has no less interesting implications 
for philosophy and theology. Indeed I would say the very point of this philo-
sophical movement is made clear only when one looks to its ethical-and 
ethico-political-upshot.30 Instead of seeking basic principles, univer-
salizable laws, or general criteria for judgment, Derrida's attention is turned 
toward "singularity" and difference. The singular is not the particular which 
is subsumed under the universal by the operations of judgment, but the idi-
osyncratic, the idiomatic, the unique and unrepeatable individual or individ-
ual situation in which ethical action must be taken. The most familiar 
antecedent for the direction taken by Derrida is Kierkegaard, whose famous 
treatment of the story of Abraham in Fear and Trembling was focused on the 
unique and nonuniversalizable situation in which Abraham was caught up by 
the incomprehensible command he received from God. If the singularity of 
this situation was of the essence of the category of the "religious" for 
Kierkegaard, then Derrida has in fact taken up a characteristically religious 
(as opposed to an aestheticizing) direction. Derrida points to the time of the 
Kierkegaardian "moment"-a philosophical category Kierkegaard derived 
from the New Testament notion of the kairos-as the time of ethics, the time 
of undecidability in which the ethical decision must be made. Like 
Kierkegaard, Derrida also thematizes the fragment, the idiosyncratic singularities 
which cannot be assimilated without remainder into and by the "System."3l 
The difference that separates Derrida from Kierkegaard is that Derrida's 
interests do not turn quite so much on the existential subject which must 
decide in fear and trembling as on the "other," on the singularity of the other 
one whose claims are visited upon the subject. Thus if Derrida does not seek 
the universal principles which secure the "legitimacy" of "moral claims," that 
is because he thinks rather of the subject which is always already "laid claim 
to" by the "other" who, to put it in the language of Levinas, come to us from 
"on high."32 He is focused not on the "autonomy" of the ethical "agent" but 
rather on a profound and thorough-going "heteronomy," which means the rule 
of the other, in virtue of which the other comes to the subject and makes it 
freedom and autonomy questionable. The rule of the other gives the rule to 
the philosophy of alterity; it sets its standards, gives it its bearings, but in 
just such a way as to lead this philosophical-or quasi-philosophical-think-
ing up to its limits, to the limits or margins of singularity, alterity and het-
eronomy. These are the "margins of philosophy," the limit situations which 
philosophy has always resisted, evaded or struggled to master. Rather than 
resisting them, deconstruction lets itself be defined by them, settling into 
these unsettling, dark interstices where traditional philosophical reflection 
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has felt least at home, inhabiting the margins between the universality of 
language and the silence of singularity. 
In a recent paper, first delivered at a conference on deconstruction and law, 
Derrida gave his most striking and provocative formulation of the ethical-
and legal and political-implication of deconstruction, by arguing that, far 
from being reduced to silence by the question of justice, deconstruction "is 
justice," that it is defined and constituted by its attachment to justice. The 
"law," he says, is deconstructible. That is because laws are a function of 
differance, i.e., they are written, historical, contingent, positive, constructs, 
effects of ecriture in the Derridian sense. Laws are sometimes just but they 
are also sometimes unjust. Conforming to law sometimes means only mere 
legality whereas the demands of justice are often served only by opposing 
the law and even spending time in jail. Laws mean to be just and justice needs 
good laws in order to be rendered, but there is always a gap, a structural 
difference, between justice and the law. For while the law is always dec on-
structible-and if it were not, then the law would be not only an ass but a 
monster and a tyrant-"[j]ustice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or 
beyond law, is not deconstructible."33 
The undeconstructibility of justice does not refer to a Kantian Idea, to a 
Platonic eidos or agathon, to the eternity of God or some noumenal being in 
itself, but to the radical singularity of the other to whom justice is owed. The 
singularity of the other is a structural limit towards which deconstruction is 
always straining, and this is almost perfectly exemplified in the ethical situ-
ation. A good law is a law without proper names, without rigged definite 
descriptions. 34 But justice is owed to the singularities which bear proper 
names. A perfect set of laws would be like a perfect map; it would end up 
being the same size as the region of which it is supposed to be the map. That 
would undo it as a map or a set of laws. A perfect set of laws is impossible,35 
not only practically but theoretically. The point of deconstruction is to inhabit 
the structural gap between justice and the law-or between language and the 
other of language-and to sensitize the law to the singularities to which the 
law is structurally blind, which the law excludes, omits, dismisses, disregards, 
forgets, silences, injures. Such singularities and alterities, which can never 
assume the force of the law, are what gives deconstruction its force. They 
drive, solicit and appeal to deconstruction analyses to keep the law open, 
pliable, revisable, flexible, self-correcting, i.e., to keep it oriented towards 
justice, which has to do with singularities. 
The particular predilection that deconstruction shows for singularity, and 
the resistance it has to a thematics of autonomy and universality and to 
cultivating universalizable rationalization procedures, are, I believe, to be 
attributed to the fact that at a crucial point deconstruction has recourse to a 
Jewish rather than a Greek paradigm. In my view, deconstruction does not 
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have a Greek but a Jewish law in mind. It does not seek a philosophical 
conception of justice but a more biblical justice. This is to be explained not 
because there is anything devout about Derrida-the point of view of his 
work as an author is not religious-but because the strains of biblical religion 
have made their way into his work by way of his considerable interest in the 
work of Levinas. In Levinas, we witness the strange occurrence of an almost 
prophetic voice raised up among the postmoderns, of a modern day Amos 
crying out for justice in the muted terms of a certain phenomenology of 
ethical obligation, a phenomenology which is neither Husserlian nor Heideg-
gerian, which is even in a sense not quite phenomenological. From the very 
start-from his earliest criticism of Husserl for treating the "other" as the 
transcendental analogue of the ego, Levinas has been convinced that philoso-
phy cannot absorb the shock of genuine alterity. The sights of philosophy are 
incorrigibly set-to use Levinas' idiom-on being and phenomenality, while 
the other person comes to us from beyond being and beyond appearance, as 
a kind of moral infinity that bursts asunder the finite horizons of philosophical 
categories. As the most important of the European thinkers of this century to 
philosophize explicitly out of an experience of the' Holocaust, Levinas insists 
on the irreducible alterity and unencompassable infinity of the other person, 
from whose face issues the categorical command "thou shalt not kill." Levi-
nas' is a philosophy of the impossibility of murder, of the other whose claim 
on us is unavoidable. The other, Levinas says, is emblematically "the widow, 
the orphan and the stranger" of Exodus 22:21, the one who is laid low, the 
helpless one who calls out for help, the outcast who abridges and lays claim 
to our freedom and agency, who elicits and solicits our responsibility. 
Levinas' unmistakably biblical, even Yahwistic, philosophy of alterity has 
been a central motif and an important impulse for Derrida's deconstruction, 
one whose centrality we are just really beginning to appreciate. Levinas does 
not constitute an ad hoc addition to Derrida's repertoire, a source to which 
Derrida beats a hasty retreat when pressed about the ethics of deconstruction. 
Levinas is an essential and an original impulse of deconstruction, one of the 
primary sources of the experience of alterity from which the philosophy of 
differance first took its bearings.36 Although Derrida is not a religious writer 
and does not, as far as I know, hold any religious views, his thought seems 
to me in no small part driven by a kind of biblical sensitivity, let us say a 
hyperbolic sensitivity or hypersensitivity, to the demands of the other, to the 
claims laid upon us by the different one, of the one who is left out or cast 
out, who lacks a voice or a hearing, a standing or stature. 
This is I think a rather more biblical than Greek and philosophical way to 
think about ethics. If we try to think philosophically about the sort of "ethics" 
contained in the New Testament we find a systematic valorization of the 
"different," not the same; of the other, not the self; of the singular, not the 
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universal. The interest of the New Testament is in the leper and the lame, the 
Samaritan and the prodigal son, the prostitute and the sinner. The kingdom 
of God is vested in what St. Paul called the me onta of the world (l Cor. 1 :28), 
those who are not so much "beyond being" as beneath being, less than being, 
the things which are not, which lack what the world, and what philosophy 
which belongs to the world, calls being. The scandal of Jesus lies in the 
preferential option he shows for these me onta, for the humble, the impure, 
the outcast, and in his willingness to set aside the rule of law and a law of 
rules in order to heal on the sabbath or to sit down to dinner with the ritually 
impure. One can hardly imagine a more characteristic story in the New Tes-
tament than that of the man with the withered hand who is brought before 
Jesus by the Pharisees to see if Jesus would break the laws of the sabbath by 
healing the man's hand (Mark 3: 1-6). From a deconstructive point of view, 
the law of the sabbath is deconstructible, but justice, which is not decon-
structible, demands that the man's hand be healed. The man with the withered 
calls to us from beyond the law, from beneath the law, and calls for justice. 
For the law was made for the singularity, not the singularity for the law. 
Conclusion: Toward a Christian Deconstruction 
If deconstruction is a philosophy of alterity, if it has nothing to do with the 
caricature of philosophical tricksters playing with words, then it has impor-
tant bearings upon the self-understanding of Christian faith. It helps, as I have 
only indicated here, to cultivate a nuanced sense both of the alterity of God 
and of the impossibility of treating God as absolutely other; and it refocuses 
Christian ethics on the ethics of the other, the lame and the leper, the widow, 
the orphan and the stranger. However, many other implications remain to be 
explored. Deconstruction can also play an important role in delimiting the 
institutional power that Christianity has accumulated and in sensitizing Chris-
tianity to the victims of that power, to women and the Jews, e.g., to its almost 
structural anti-Semitism, anti-feminism and Eurocentrism. Deconstruction 
can awaken Christianity to the deeply historical and textual character of the 
sacred scriptures themselves and to the contingency of dogmatic formulations 
that have evolved in the tradition. It can give a renewed appreciation of the 
multiplicity of the Christian tradition, of the voices that are silenced in and 
by the tradition, producing thereby the illusion of "the" tradition. Christian 
tradition is many traditions, many forgotten and suppressed voices which 
need to be heard. Deconstruction can sensitize Christianity to the other of 
Christianity, not only to the other Christianities within Christianity which it 
silences, but also to the equiprimordiality of religious experiences outside of 
the Christian confessions. 
The deconstruction of Christianity eventuates in a Christian deconstruction. 
That is not a destruction of Christianity but a radical pluralizing and opening 
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up of the many Christianities that are possible. Christian deconstruction 
would represent not a destructive diluting of Christianity but rather the most 
rigorous loyalty to the oldest Christian example of all, to the One Who did 
not hesitate to deconstruct the law of the sabbath in name of divine justice, 
or to sit down to dinner with sinners and the outcast. A Christian deconstruc-
tion would not amount to a negative destruction of Christian faith and tradi-
tion but to the most radical allegiance to a certain rabboni who was, to the 
scandal of all, a teacher of alterity, who to everyone's consternation kept 
spreading the good news about alterity. Usque ad mortem. 
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